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Abstract 
 
This study demonstrates that a model with efficiency wages and imperfect information 
produces a Phillips curve relationship. Equations are derived for labor demand and the 
efficiency wage-setting condition, and shifts in these curves in response to aggregate 
demand shocks result in a relationship with the characteristics of a Phillips curve. The 
Phillips curve differs from the efficiency wage-setting condition in that the Phillips curve 
is a more parsimonious expression and has a coefficient on expected inflation equal to 1. 
Also derived from this model is the counterpart curve to the Phillips curve in 
unemployment – inflation space. 
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Efficiency Wage Setting, Labor Demand, and Phillips Curve Microfoundations 
  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Phillips curve was originally developed as a relationship between unemployment 
and the rate of either wage or price inflation.1 Subsequent work by Friedman (1968) and 
Phelps (1968) argued that expected inflation should be included as an independent variable in 
a Phillips curve, with a predicted coefficient of 1. While researchers have found empirical 
evidence for the expectations-augmented Phillips curve,2
This study demonstrates that a downward-sloping Phillips curve results from the 
profit-maximizing behavior of firms, under the assumptions that firms pay efficiency wages 
and that workers have imperfect information about average wages or about the aggregate 
price level. A wage-wage Phillips curve is obtained if workers’ efficiency depends on their 
wages relative to the average wage, and a price-price Phillips curve is obtained if workers’ 
efficiency depends on their real wages. These Phillips curves, however, are not directly 
derived from the first-order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem. Rather, they are 
 it has been much more difficult to 
provide theoretical justification for it. For example, Fuhrer (1995, p. 43) states, “Perhaps the 
greatest weakness of the Phillips curve is its lack of theoretical underpinnings: No one has 
derived a Phillips curve from first principles, beginning with the fundamental concerns and 
constraints of consumers and firms.” In a similar vein, Mankiw (2001, p. C46) writes, “The 
[Phillips curve] tradeoff remains mysterious, however, for the economics profession has yet 
to produce a satisfactory theory to explain it.” 
In addition, the Phillips curve does not have a counterpart curve in unemployment – 
inflation space. Thus, the Phillips curve framework shows the combinations of 
unemployment and inflation that are possible but does make predictions about the actual 
values of inflation and unemployment. 
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obtained by substituting one first-order condition into another. In addition, this study derives 
the counterpart to the Phillips curve (referred to as the dynamic labor demand curve) in 
inflation – unemployment space from the same framework used to derive the Phillips curve. 
This curve is upward sloping when the dependent variable is wage inflation and is downward 
sloping when the dependent variable is price inflation. Shifts in the Phillips curve and the 
dynamic labor demand curve trace out the paths of inflation and unemployment in response 
to demand or technology shocks. 
For both the case in which efficiency depends on relative wages (in Section III) and 
the case in which efficiency depends on real wages (in Section IV), the profit function is 
differentiated with respect to wages and employment, and the production function and the 
unemployment equation are substituted into the first-order conditions. The resulting 
equations are the labor demand curve and the efficiency wage-setting condition, expressed as 
relationships between unemployment and wages (when efficiency depends on relative wages) 
or prices (when efficiency depends on real wages). Taking first differences yields the 
dynamic labor demand (DLD) curve and the dynamic efficiency wage-setting (DEWS) 
condition, in which the left-hand side variable is the rate of wage or price inflation. 
In response to shocks to the growth rate of nominal demand, shifts in the DLD curve 
and DEWS condition trace out the paths of inflation (either of wages or prices) and 
unemployment. An increase (decrease) in demand growth initially reduces (raises) 
unemployment and raises (reduces) inflation by less than the change in the growth rate of 
demand. Over time, however, unemployment returns to its original level, and inflation equals 
the new growth rate of demand. Thus, the model is characterized by a natural rate of 
unemployment in response to nominal demand shocks. The framework developed here can 
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also be used to analyze the effects of technology shocks. These shocks affect unemployment 
when efficiency depends on real wages, but not when efficiency depends on relative wages.  
There is another way to derive the transition paths of inflation and unemployment in 
response to exogenous shocks. If labor demand is substituted into the efficiency wage-setting 
condition, a third relationship is obtained. The transition can be illustrated by the 
intersections between the dynamic labor demand curve and this new relationship. This third 
relationship has the characteristics of a Phillips curve. When efficiency depends on relative 
wages, wage inflation depends on unemployment and expected wage inflation. When 
efficiency depends on real wages, price inflation depends on unemployment, technology 
shocks, and expected price inflation. In both cases, the coefficient on expected inflation 
equals 1.  
While the economy’s transition path can be illustrated either by the dynamic labor 
demand curve and the dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition or by the dynamic labor 
demand curve and the Phillips curve, the latter is a more parsimonious and convenient 
specification. The Phillips curve depends on just expected inflation, the unemployment rate, 
and technology shocks (when efficiency depends on real wages), and the coefficient on 
expected inflation equals one. In contrast, the dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition 
depends on more variables, including the change in nominal demand (which is nearly 
impossible to observe), and the coefficient on expected inflation will generally not equal one. 
This study expands upon the work of Campbell (2010), which develops a barebones 
version of the model in this study. This previous study derives equations for the wage-wage 
and price-price Phillips curves, but does not derive the dynamic labor demand curve or the 
dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition. The present study shows how a Phillips curve 
results from shifts of the dynamic labor demand curve and the dynamic efficiency wage-
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setting condition, and thus provides intuition for why the Phillips curve is obtained from a 
model with efficiency wages and imperfect information. In addition, the present study 
includes the maximization problem for workers, as well as firms, and it derives the 
counterpart to the Phillips curve.  
The model developed in this study suggests a possible reason why researchers have 
found empirical evidence for the Phillips curve but have had difficulty in deriving a Phillips 
curve from microeconomic principles. The model predicts that there is a stable relationship 
between unemployment and the difference between actual and expected inflation, so a 
Phillips curve should be observed in macroeconomic data. However, this Phillips curve is 
derived indirectly from profit maximization by substituting one first-order condition into 
another.   
II. Previous Phillips Curve Models 
Two models of the Phillips curve that have been developed in recent years are the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve and the sticky information Phillips curve. Roberts (1995) 
shows that the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be derived from the staggered contract 
models of Taylor (1979, 1980) and Calvo (1983) and from the quadratic adjustment cost 
model of Rotemberg (1982). Roberts demonstrates that these models all yield the prediction 
that inflation depends on expectations of future inflation and on the output gap.  
While the sticky price model is widely used in policy analysis,3 it has been criticized 
on several grounds. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) find that it cannot explain why inflation is so 
persistent, and Ball (1994) shows that this model predicts that announced, credible 
disinflations may cause booms instead of recessions. The sticky price model predicts that 
inflation depends on output and expected future inflation, yet many studies find that lagged 
inflation is an important determinant of current inflation, even when controlling for future 
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inflation.4 Also, it assumes that firms follow a time-dependent rather than a state-dependent 
pricing policy. However, the assumption that firms can make price adjustments at only 
certain specified times is not grounded in economic theory. In addition, the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve is a relationship between inflation and output, whereas the Phillips curve was 
initially specified as a relationship between inflation and unemployment. 
Another variant of the sticky price Phillips curve is Galí and Gertler’s (1999) model, 
which derives a Phillips curve specification in which price inflation depends on expectations 
of future marginal cost. They measure marginal cost by labor’s share of national income and 
demonstrate that their model outperforms a conventional sticky price model in which 
inflation depends on the output gap. However, while Galí and Gertler show that price 
inflation depends on the behavior of wages, their study does not analyze the factors that 
determine wages.  
In the sticky information of Mankiw and Reis (2002), a firm’s optimal price depends 
on the aggregate price level and on aggregate output. It is assumed that a fraction of firms 
receives information in each period that enables them to compute optimal prices, while the 
remaining firms set prices based on out-of-date information. The present model is similar to 
Mankiw and Reis’s model in that economic fluctuations result from imperfect information. 
However, it differs from Mankiw and Reis by assuming a different type of imperfect 
information. In the Mankiw-Reis model, firms have imperfect information about the optimal 
price of their products, and this imperfect information affects their pricing and output 
decisions. In contrast, the present study assumes that workers’ decisions that affect their 
efficiency are made with imperfect information about average wages or about the price level 
and that this imperfect information affects the wage decisions (and hence employment 
decisions) of firms. 
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It seems more realistic to attribute economic fluctuations to workers’ imperfect 
information about aggregate wages or prices than to firms’ imperfect information about 
prices and output. Firms have more resources to obtain macroeconomic data, and they have a 
greater incentive to collect these data, since the revenues of a typical firm are much larger 
than earnings of a typical individual. According to Kobe (2007), 49.3% of U.S. private 
nonfarm GDP was produced by firms with at least 500 employees in 2004 (the most recent 
year for which data were available), and it is particularly unclear why these firms would find 
it optimal to operate with out-of-date information, since a small deviation from the optimal 
price can have a large effect on profits for firms of this size. For individual workers, on the 
other hand, information about average wages or prices is needed to make decisions about 
how much effort to provide and how much on-the-job search to undertake, and incorrect 
information would probably have a small effect on their utility. Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that individuals are more likely than firms to operate with imperfect information.  
In addition, Mankiw and Reis consider firms’ pricing and output decisions but do not 
consider their wage and employment decisions, and there is no reason why firms in their 
model would not continually set wages at their market-clearing level. Also, like the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, the sticky information Phillips curve is a relationship between 
inflation and output, rather than between inflation and unemployment. 
III. The Wage-Wage Phillips Curve 
 
Assumptions about individuals’ behavior 
 
It is assumed that individuals’ utility depends positively on their consumption (c) and 
their leisure (X), with µ representing the relative weight placed on leisure in their utility 
functions. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), total consumption is the composite of the 
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purchases of the output produced by individual firms. Assuming a continuity of firms, 
indexed from 0 to 1, this implies that  
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Utility is also assumed to depend on workers’ effort (e), with the marginal utility 
being negative in equilibrium. The effort exerted in the current period affects the probability 
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where δ is the discount rate,  ]Pr[ itEmp +  is the probability that the worker is employed in 
period t+i, the superscript e represents individuals’ expectations, T is time allotment, α and η 
are parameters representing the utility or disutility of effort, r is the interest rate, P is the 
price level, and W is the wage. The first term in the utility function is the utility from 
consumption, the second is the utility from leisure when the employee is working, the third is 
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the utility or disutility of effort when the employee is working, and the fourth is the utility 
from leisure when the individual is not working.  
The Lagrangian for the worker’s utility maximization is 
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The first-order conditions with respect to c, X, and λ are 
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If the first-order conditions are approximated around their steady-state equilibria (in 
which it is assumed that the interest rate equals the discount rate), the Appendix demonstrates 
that the following equation for labor supply is obtained:  
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where e*, W*, and ∗P  represent the steady-state values of effort, wages, and prices, and λ1
itXT +−
 is 
defined in the Appendix. Since labor supply equals , the above equation for itX +  
implies that labor supply can be expressed as  
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The short-run labor-supply elasticity (i.e., NN /′ ) will be denoted by ψ. 
The Lagrangian is not differentiated with respect to effort, because the effect of effort 
on utility is quite complicated. Current effort not only affects currently utility but also affects 
expected future utility through its effect on the probability that a worker is employed in each 
future period. To derive an expression for the optimal level of effort, it is necessary to make 
assumptions about the probability that a worker is dismissed (as a function of his or her 
effort) and the probability that an unemployed worker is hired. Campbell (2006) develops a 
model of workers’ effort with a similar utility function and budget constraint and makes 
assumptions about the probability of dismissal and the probability of hire.5 It is demonstrated 
that workers’ efficiency depends on the ratio of their current wage to the average wage at 
other firms and on the unemployment rate, such that 
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where Wt etW is the wage at a worker’s current firm, denotes workers’ expectations of the 
average wage rate, and ut is the unemployment rate.6
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As in Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) model, the demand curve facing each firm can be 
expressed as 
 ,  (4) 
 
where P is the firm’s price, P is the aggregate price level, γ is the price elasticity of demand, 
and Y is real aggregate demand per firm. 
Thus, given the assumptions about workers’ utility functions and the constraints they 
face, equations are derived for labor supply, effort, and the demand for the output of 
individual firms. In addition, it will be assumed that wages vary across firms and that 
workers do not know the average wage with certainty.7 If information on average wages is 
costly, workers’ expectations may not necessarily satisfy the criteria for rational expectations 
and may be based partly on old information. This assumption could be incorporated into (1) 
by assuming that workers suffer a utility loss from incorrect information about average wages 
and incur a cost to acquire information, and thus find it optimal to acquire a limited amount 
of information.8 (However, incorporating this assumption into (1) would significantly 
complicate the model, without yielding any insights beyond the current discussion.)  
 
 
Assumptions about firms’ behavior 
 
1. Firms produce output (Q) with the Cobb-Douglas production function,  
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where A represents technology (assumed to be exogenous and labor augmenting), L 
represents labor, and K represents capital (assumed to be fixed).  
2. Real aggregate demand per firm is determined from the constant velocity specification,  
 ttt PMY /= ,  (6) 
where M is nominal demand.  
3.  Parameters are such that firms pay efficiency wages, yielding excess supply of labor.9
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The unemployment rate can be expressed as 
  . (7) 
Derivations of the DLD, DEWS, and Phillips curves 
 
 Solving (4) for tP  and multiplying by tQ  yields the following equation for total 
revenue: 
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 Differentiating the profit function yields the following first-order conditions: 
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Combining (9a) and (9b) and taking steady-state values (i.e., WW = ) yields the 
following equilibrium condition: 
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The steady-state condition, 11 =−eeW , determines the economy’s natural rate of 
unemployment. In addition, this condition will be used to simplify equations expressed in 
terms of deviations from steady-state values.  
Equation (9a) is the labor demand curve, and equation (9b) is the efficiency wage-
setting condition. If (9a) and (9b) are totally differentiated and divided by the original 
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where ttt WdWW /ˆ =  and 
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ˆ = . The above equations can be viewed as the 
relationships between percentage deviations in Wt etW, percentage deviations in , and 
absolute deviations in ut
eW
 (in percentage-point terms) from their steady-state equilibrium 
values. If small deviations of W, , and u from their steady-state values are considered, the 
coefficients on these variables can be treated as constants, with these constants determined by 
the steady-state values of Wt etW, , e, eW, eu, eWW, and eWu
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The Appendix demonstrates that calculating deviations in steady-state values in the 
production function (equation 5) and in the unemployment equation (equation 7) and 
substituting these expressions into the labor demand and efficiency wage setting equations 
yields  
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Equations (13a) and (13b) are, respectively, the labor demand curve and the efficiency wage-
setting condition expressed as the relationships between wages and unemployment. If the lag 
of each equation is subtracted, the following equations are obtained for wage inflation: 
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Equation (14a) will be called the dynamic labor demand (DLD) curve, and equation 
(14b) will be called the dynamic efficiency wage-setting (DEWS) condition. The dynamic 
efficiency wage-setting condition is a relatively complicated expression that includes the 
changes in the unemployment rate, expected wage inflation, expected price inflation, and 
nominal demand. Neither the coefficient on the change in expected wage inflation nor the 
coefficient on the change in expected price inflation will generally equal 1. 
The DLD-DEWS framework can be used to illustrate how wage inflation and 
unemployment evolve over time in response to a shock to the growth rate of nominal demand 
( tMˆ ). In particular, it is assumed that demand is growing at a rate of g
o prior to period 1 and 
that the growth rate of demand falls to gn in period 1 and remains at gn
There are at least two approaches to modeling expectations when information is 
costly. One is to assume, in the spirit of Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky information model, 
that each period a fraction of workers receives new information about the current and future 
expected values of average wages, while the rest operate with out-of-date information. Let θ 
represent the proportion of workers who receive new information in each period. Suppose 
that workers whose information has not been updated expect wages to continue to grow at a 
rate of g
 indefinitely. To 
analyze the response of these variables to a shock to nominal demand, it is necessary to make 
assumptions about the nature of inflationary expectations and about the parameters in (14a) 
and (14b). There are several ways in which inflationary expectations can be modeled. It could 
be assumed that inflationary expectations are rational, in which case nominal demand shocks 
have no systematic effect on unemployment. However, as previously discussed, workers may 
choose not to acquire all available information if information is costly.   
o, while workers who have received new information know that demand has grown 
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and will continue to grow at a rate of gn since period 1. Suppose also that these workers know 
that the fraction of workers receiving new information in each period is θ and know that 
workers whose information has not been updated since period 0 will expect wages to rise at a 
rate of go. Then these workers will have rational expectations about average wages from the 
time when they receive this information onwards.10
tot
t
te
t gWWW )1()1(])1(1[ 0 +−+−−= θθ
 Thus, overall expectations can be 
expressed as 
. 
Given this expression for expectations, it can be demonstrated that nominal demand shocks 
will have systematic effects on employment and output.  
A second approach to modeling workers’ expectations when information about 
current average wages is costly is to assume, as in Campbell (2010), that expectations are a 
mixture of rational and adaptive expectations, so that  
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where ω represents the degree to which expectations are rational. A model providing 
justification for this assumption from the utility-maximizing behavior of workers is 
developed in Campbell (2011).11
Simulations are performed under the assumption that workers’ expectations are a 
mixture of rational and adaptive expectations. (The assumptions of sticky information and of 
mixed rational and adaptive expectations give similar results, so only the latter case is 
considered.) In these simulations ω is set at 0.5 (i.e., expectations are assumed to be an equal 
mixture of rational and adaptive expectations). Consistent with empirical evidence, it is 
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assumed that λ1 032 ==== Tλλλ =1 and that .
12 In addition, the equilibrium 
unemployment rate is set at 5%, the steady-state values of e, eW, eu, and eWu are the same as 
those in Campbell (2008) with the micro-based efficiency function, and the short-run labor 
supply elasticity (ψ) is assumed to equal 0 since empirical studies find that this elasticity is 
low.13 The value of eWW is set so that the slope of the Phillips curve equals -1, in line with 
estimates with annual data from Blanchard and Katz (1997). 
Figure 1 shows how wage inflation and unemployment respond over time to a 
decrease in the growth rate of demand from 5% to 0%. The DLD and the DEWS curves are 
shown for the initial equilibrium and the first three periods following the reduction in 
nominal demand growth.14
tMˆ
 Values of inflation and unemployment are denoted by dots 
(including values after period 3), and the initial and first five unemployment–inflation points 
are numbered. This demand shock initially causes a rise in unemployment and a fall in 
inflation. Over time, the path of the dots shows that the economy eventually reaches a new 
equilibrium in which unemployment returns to the natural rate and inflation equals the new 
growth rate of demand.  
While the DLD-DEWS framework is one way to show the paths of wage inflation and 
unemployment in the transition between equilbria, there is another way to show the transition 
paths. If (13a) is solved for  and the resulting expression is substituted into (13b), the 
following equation is obtained: 
 t
WW
Wuue
tt due
eeWW −+= ˆˆ . (15) 
If 1ˆ −tW  is subtracted from both sides of (15), the relationship can be expressed as 
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eeWWWW −+−=− −− )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( 11 . (16) 
 
 Equation (16) has the characteristics of the Phillips curve (PC), as the coefficient on 
expected inflation equals 1, the level of the unemployment rate appears on the right-hand side 
with a negative sign (since 0>ue , 0<Wue , and 0<WWe ) and the growth rate of demand is 
not an explanatory variable.  
Figure 2 illustrates the response of wage inflation and unemployment to a decline in 
the growth rate of demand from 5% to 0%, using the DLD-PC framework.15 (The thick line 
is the Phillips curve.) The DEWS condition is also included in Figure 2. A comparison of 
Figures 1 and 2 shows that the DLD-PC framework and the DLD-DEWS framework both 
predict the same paths of wage inflation and unemployment. 
While the DLD-DEWS framework and the DLD-PC framework give the same results, 
the Phillips curve is a much more parsimonious specification than the dynamic efficiency 
wage-setting condition. The DEWS condition includes the changes in nominal demand and 
expected price inflation, variables that do not appear in the Phillips curve. The 
unemployment variable is the change in unemployment in the DEWS condition, but is the 
level of unemployment in the Phillips curve. In addition, the DEWS condition includes the 
change in wage expectations between periods t-1 and t, and the coefficient on this difference 
depends on the model’s microeconomic parameters. Thus, it is likely to vary across countries 
and across time, and it is unlikely to equal 1. In contrast, the Phillips curve includes expected 
wage inflation, and the coefficient on this variable equals 1 for any set of microeconomic 
parameters.  
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Equation (16) predicts a stable relationship between unemployment and the difference 
between actual and expected inflation. Thus, a researcher with data on wage inflation and 
unemployment and with a reasonable proxy for expected wage inflation would likely find 
evidence for the Phillips curve.  
The exogenous variable that causes the DLD and DEWS curves to shift, and thus 
causes changes in unemployment and inflation, is the growth rate of nominal demand (M). In 
deriving the Phillips curve, however, nominal demand drops out. Thus, the Phillips curve can 
be viewed as the relationship between two endogenous variables as they adjust in response to 
a nominal demand shock. The actual values of unemployment and wage inflation depend on 
the interaction between the Phillips curve and the DLD curve.  
The relationship expressed in (16) is between wage inflation, unemployment, and 
expected wage inflation (i.e., a wage-wage Phillips curve). However, when economists 
estimate Phillips curves, the right-hand side variable is generally expected price inflation 
rather than expected wage inflation. While expected price inflation is the independent 
variable in the vast majority of Phillips curve studies, the right-hand side variable is expected 
wage inflation in Phelps’s (1968) seminal paper, resulting in a wage-wage Phillips curve.16
Aˆ
 
Technology shocks ( ) do not appear in the dynamic labor demand curve or in the 
Phillips curve. The reason they do not appear in either equation is that technology shocks 
leave nominal wages and unemployment unchanged in both the short run and the long run. 
While technology shocks do not affect wages and unemployment, these shocks immediately 
and permanently change prices by -φ times the percentage change in technology.  
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IV. The Price-Price Phillips Curve 
It is now assumed that workers’ efficiency depends on the ratio between their wages 
and their expectations of the price level. If efficiency depends on price expectations, 
equations (4), (6), (7), and (8) become  
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Combining (19) and (20) and taking steady-state values yields the following 
equilibrium condition: 
.1,, 1 =






 −
eeeW P
Wu
P
Weu
P
We  (21) 
As in Section III, this steady-state condition determines the natural rate of 
unemployment and will be used to simplify equations expressed in terms of deviations from 
steady-state values.  
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The Appendix demonstrates that the labor demand curve and the efficiency wage-
setting condition are, respectively, 
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where ζ equals the equilibrium ratio between wages and prices. The dynamic labor demand 
curve and the dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition are derived by subtracting the lag of 
each equation, yielding 
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The Appendix demonstrates that if (22a) is solved for tMˆ  and the resulting 
expression is substituted into (22b), the following relationship is obtained: 
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Subtracting 1−tP from both yields  
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Equation (26) has the characteristics of a Phillips curve, as the coefficient on expected 
inflation equals 1 and the coefficient on the unemployment rate is negative (since 1-φ>0, 
eu>0, eWW<0, eWu<0, ψ≥0, ζ>0, and 1-ω>0). In addition, price inflation depends negatively 
on technology shocks.  
Figure 3 shows the paths of unemployment and price inflation in response to a 
deceleration in the growth of nominal demand from go to gn (where go=5% and gn
The economy’s response to a technology shock is illustrated in Figure 4 for the initial 
equilibrium and for four periods following the shock. In particular, it is assumed that 
=0%), 
using the dynamic labor demand curve (23) and the Phillips curve (26) for the initial 
equilibrium and for three periods following the deceleration in demand. As before, values of 
unemployment and inflation are denoted by dots (including values after period 3). This 
deceleration initially causes a rise in the unemployment rate and a fall in inflation. In the long 
run, the economy returns to a new equilibrium in which unemployment equals the natural 
rate and inflation equals the new growth rate of nominal demand. While the transition path is 
not illustrated using the DLD curve and the DEWS condition, the same intersection points 
are obtained with the DLD–DEWS framework and the DLD–PC framework. 
As before, the Phillips curve is a more parsimonious and convenient specification 
than the DEWS condition. The growth rate of nominal demand appears in the dynamic 
efficiency wage-setting condition but not in the Phillips curve, and the coefficient on 
expected inflation equals 1 in the Phillips curve, but not in the dynamic efficiency wage-
setting condition.  
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technology decreases by 3% in period 1 and remains at this level indefinitely. (In these 
simulations it is assumed that nominal demand remains constant.) Initially, unemployment 
and inflation both rise, but then decrease as the economy adjusts to its new equilibrium. 
 Under the assumption that efficiency depends on real wages, a technology shock 
alters the equilibrium unemployment rate. A technology shock changes the equilibrium real 
wage, and equation (21) shows that a change in the equilibrium real wage is associated with a 
change in the economy’s equilibrium unemployment rate. Thus, if efficiency depends on real 
wages, the economy is not characterized by a fixed natural rate of unemployment in response 
to technology shocks. However, as discussed in the next section, it is much more likely that 
efficiency depends on relative than on real wages in the long run. Because the assumption 
that efficiency depends on real wages probably does not describe the long run, points 
corresponding to inflation and unemployment after period 4 are not included in Figure 4.  
V. Does Workers’ Efficiency Depend on Relative or Real Wages? 
In the model in Section III, workers’ efficiency depends on their wage relative to 
average wages, while their efficiency depends on the real wage in Section IV. There is little 
empirical evidence concerning whether efficiency is a function of relative or real wages. 
Theoretical considerations seem to suggest that workers’ efficiency is likely to depend more 
on relative wages than on real wages since quit decisions and effort decisions (based on the 
shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) should depend on a worker’s wage relative to 
wages elsewhere. However, there are reasons why efficiency may depend on real wages in 
the short run. First, in the fair wage model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), workers may view 
the fair wage as a function of the real wage and thus feel that their employer has an obligation 
to compensate them for a rise in consumer prices. Second, even if workers are concerned 
about their relative wages, they may use information about price inflation to predict how 
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rapidly wages are rising at other firms, since price inflation data are more widely publicized 
than wage inflation data, and these series are highly correlated. Thus, it is possible that, in the 
short run, both real and relative wages affect efficiency. In the long run, it is almost certain 
that efficiency depends on relative wages, since what ultimately matters for workers’ quit and 
effort decisions are their wages relative to wages elsewhere. For example, real wages have 
risen dramatically since World War II, yet we have not observed a significant increase in 
effort or a significant decline in the quit rate.   
Even if workers’ efficiency is a function of relative wages, it is still likely that 
economists will find evidence for a price-price and wage-price Phillips curve, as well as for a 
wage-wage Phillips curve. Campbell (2009b) demonstrates that a model in which efficiency 
depends on relative wages yields asymptotic price-price and wage-price Phillip curves in 
response to stochastic aggregate demand shocks. In this model, equations are derived for the 
paths of wages, prices, and unemployment in response to nominal demand shocks, and these 
equations are used as data in a theoretical regression of either price inflation or wage inflation 
on unemployment and lagged price inflation. In such a regression it is demonstrated that 
inflation depends on the level of unemployment and that the coefficient on lagged price 
inflation asymptotically approaches 1 as the sample size increases, and it is close to 1 even 
when the sample size is small.  
VI. Possible Extensions of the Model 
There are several ways in which this model could be extended. One is to generalize 
the model to assume that workers’ efficiency depends on the ratio between their wage and 
their reference wage ( RtW ), the wage to which workers compare their own wages in making 
decisions that affect their efficiency (e.g., deciding how hard to work or how much time to 
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devote to job search, which affects their quit propensities). Under this assumption, efficiency 
can be expressed as 
 ],/[ t
R
tt uWWee = . 
An important determinant of the reference wage is workers’ expectations of the 
average wage, as assumed in Section III. However, the reference wage may also depend on 
workers’ perception of their fair wage.18 Determinants of a worker’s perceived fair wage may 
include the worker’s past wage or past wage increases. For example, since last period’s wage 
may be a determinant of the reference wage, firms may be reluctant to reduce nominal wages, 
even in times when workers know that economic conditions are poor, providing a possible 
explanation for nominal wage rigidity. In addition, if a worker has received x% wage 
increases for the past several years, he or she may view the fair wage as last period’s wage 
plus an x% increase. Such a model can explain why wages generally increase in recessions, 
even if workers have rational expectations about average wages, since firms may have an 
incentive to continue to grant wage increases when unemployment is high. 
A second possible extension is to assume that wages are set by multi-period 
overlapping contracts. In the models developed in this study, wages can be changed each 
period. Since the typical worker’s wages are adjusted once a year (if at all), this implies that 
each period in these models corresponds to a year of actual time. However, to model short-
run fluctuations it is often more convenient to treat a period as a quarter.  If wages are set by 
4-period overlapping contracts, firms that reset their wages in the current period will take into 
account the wages they expect to be set by firms who adjust their wages in the next three 
periods. In this case, wages will depend on expected future wage inflation, as well as on past 
inflation.19 
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VII. Conclusion 
While the Phillips curve has been an important component of empirical 
macroeconomic modeling, it has been a challenge for economists to provide theoretical 
justification for this relationship. This study demonstrates that a Phillips curve can be derived 
from a model in which firms pay efficiency wages and workers have imperfect information 
about average wages or about the aggregate price level. Firms’ maximization problem yields 
equations for the dynamic labor demand curve and the dynamic efficiency wage-setting 
condition, and shifts of these curves trace out the paths of unemployment and wage or price 
inflation in response to shocks.  
If one of these first-order conditions is substituted into the other, a third equation is 
obtained. This third relationship has the characteristics of a Phillips curve, as the coefficient 
on expected inflation equals 1, inflation depends on the level of unemployment (rather than 
the change in unemployment), and the change in nominal demand does not appear. Shifts in 
the dynamic labor demand curve and the Phillips curve produce the same paths for inflation 
and unemployment as shifts in the dynamic labor demand curve and the dynamic efficiency 
wage-setting condition. However, the former is a more convenient framework because fewer 
variables appear in the Phillips curve than in the DEWS condition, and the coefficient on 
expected inflation is 1 in the Phillips curve but is generally not equal to 1 in the DEWS 
condition.   
In conventional specifications, the Phillips curve shows the combinations of inflation 
and unemployment that are possible, but it does not predict the actual values of inflation and 
unemployment. The present study uses a consistent framework to derive both the Phillips 
curve and the dynamic labor demand curve from the profit-maximizing behavior of firms. 
The intersections of these two curves determine the values of inflation and unemployment 
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that result from nominal demand shocks or technology shocks in the transition between the 
economy’s initial equilibrium and its new equilibrium. Thus, the model developed in this 
study not only shows the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, but also predicts the 
paths of these variables over time.  
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Appendix 
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Derivation of equation (3): 
If it is assumed that the interest rate equals the discount rate, then (2a) can be 
expressed as 
 . (A1a) 
 
In addition, (2b) can be approximated as (A1b) 
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where *’s represent steady-state values of a variable. In equilibrium, the probability that an 
individual is employed in each period is 1-u*, where u* is the natural rate of unemployment. 
Substituting (A1a), (A1b), and Pr[Emp]=1-u* into (2c) yields 
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The above equation can be rewritten as  
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The value of λ can be calculated from the quadratic equation:  
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Since labor supply equals itXT +− , the above expression for itX +  implies that labor 
supply is a positive function of  
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Derivation of the Wage-Wage Phillips Curve 
Letting sL )/(/ ettt PWNL equal the steady-state value of  and ψ represent the steady-
state value of the short-run labor supply elasticity (with ψ≥0), tdu can be approximated by 
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Solving the above equation for Lt
e
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Totally differentiating (4), dividing by the original equation, and using the fact that 
Qt=Yt tYˆ results in the following expression for : 
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Since 1/ =eWW  in the steady state and since (from equation (8)) 11 =−eeW , the 
above equation can be expressed as 
e
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To derive the labor demand equation, eq. (A1) and the relationships ttt YMP ˆˆ
ˆ −= , 
1/ =eWW , and 11 =−eeW  are substituted into (9) yielding, 
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If (A4) is substituted into (A5), the equation simplifies to 
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From (A2), (A6) can be expressed as 
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Solving for tWˆ  yields the following equation for labor demand: 
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 To derive the efficiency wage-setting condition, (A4) is substituted into (10), yielding 
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If (A2) and (A4) are substituted into (A8) (along with the facts that 1/ =eWW  and 
11 =−eeW ) and the equation is solved for tWˆ  , the following equation for the efficiency wage-
setting condition is obtained: 
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Price-Price Phillips Curve 
Totally differentiating (17) and dividing by the original equation yields  
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Substituting (21) and (A2) into (A10) yields 
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To obtain the labor demand curve, (19) is totally differentiated and divided by the 
original equation, yielding 
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If (21) and (A2) are substituted into (A12), the following equation is obtained: 
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If (A13) is solved for tWˆ  and the resulting expression is substituted into (A11), tYˆ  can 
be expressed as 
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Since ttt YMP ˆˆ
ˆ −= , the price level can be expressed as 
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Eq. (A16) is the equation for the labor demand curve. To obtain the efficiency wage-
setting condition for the case in which efficiency depends on real wages, (20) is totally 
differentiated and divided by the original equation, yielding 
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Let ePW /=ζ . Then if (21) and (A2) are substituted into (A17), the following 
equation is obtained: 
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where ψ
γ
γφφγζ
γ
γφφγκ −−−−−−−= −1WWW ee . 
If (A18) is substituted into (A11), output can be expressed as 
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From the relationship, ttt YMP ˆˆ
ˆ −= , the price level is 
 34 
.
1
][
ˆ
1
)1(
ˆ
1
]1[ˆ
1
)1)(1(ˆ
1
111111
1
1
1
1
1
t
WWW
LWWWuWWWWWuWWu
e
t
WWW
t
WWW
WWW
t
WWW
WWW
t
du
ee
seeeeeeeeee
P
ee
A
ee
eeM
ee
eeP
ψζ
ζζψφ
ψζ
ψφ
ψζ
ψζφ
ψζ
ζψφ
+−
+−+
−
+−
+
+
+−
+−
−
+−
−+−
=
−
−−−−−−
−
−
−
−
−
 
 
tMˆ
Derivation of equation (25) 
Solving (22a) for  yields 
tu
e
tttt dueePAPM
1
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
1
1ˆ −
−
+
−
−
−
+
−
=
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
. (A20) 
 
If (A20) is substituted into (22b), the following equation is obtained: 
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Since 1/ −== W
e eePWζ , if the numerator and denominator of the coefficient on dut 
are multiplied by sL
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 Phillips (1958) finds an inverse relationship between wage inflation and unemployment with British data 
from 1861-1957. Samuelson and Solow (1960) show that a similar relationship can be derived between price 
inflation and unemployment.   
2 See King and Watson (1994) and Fuhrer (1995) for empirical evidence for the Phillips curve.  
3 According to McCallum (1997), the Calvo-Rotemberg model of the Phillips curve, has become “the 
closest thing there is to a standard specification.”    
4 See, for example, Fuhrer (1997) and Rudd and Whelan (2005). 
5 The model of Campbell (2006) differs from the model in the present study in that Campbell (2006) does 
not consider the utility from leisure (X), allows individuals to hold non-labor wealth, and assumes that 
unemployed individuals receive benefits. Since the first-order conditions in the present study are approximated 
around their steady-state values and the last two differences are minor, the qualitative predictions of Campbell 
(2006) will be valid for the model in the present study. In Campbell (2006), the probability of dismissal is 
2)1( emPD −= , where m is the firm’s monitoring intensity, and the probability of hire is 
])1)(/[()]1)([( uuqPDuqPDh +−+−+= . In the hiring equation, q represents the probability of an exogenous 
separation, the numerator is the number of new hires in a period, and the denominator is the pool of the 
unemployed at the beginning of the period.  
6 In this model, wages have a positive effect on efficiency through their effect on workers’ effort. Another 
reason why wages may affect efficiency is by reducing turnover.   
7 Wages could vary across firms if the profit-maximizing wage is set on average, but firms make random 
errors in setting wages.  
8 Incorrect information about average wages is costly because it results in suboptimal levels of effort. For 
example, a worker who overestimates average wages will exert less than optimal effort, so that on average, the 
loss of future earnings resulting from the increased probability of dismissal will exceed the utility gain from 
lower effort. A worker underestimating average wages will suffer the opposite type of utility loss. 
9 Assuming a positive relationship between wages and efficiency does not guarantee that there will be 
excess supply of labor. Whether a firm operates on its labor supply curve or to the left of its labor supply curve 
(i.e., pays an efficiency wage) depends on the elasticity of output with respect to the wage, calculated at the 
market-clearing wage. It is assumed that parameters are chosen so that firms maximize profits by operating to 
the left of their labor supply curves. 
10 This information would enable these workers to form correct expectations about the wage expectations of 
the average worker. Knowing the firm’s profit function would enable them to use this information to form 
correct expectations of average wages.  
11 In Campbell (2011), workers use a Kalman filtering process to form their expectations, looking at an 
infinite number of lags (i.e., T=∞), with exponentially declining values of λ.  
12 Using annual data from the Employment Cost Index, current wage inflation was regressed on five values 
of lagged wage inflation. The coefficient on the first lag was close to 1, and the coefficients on further lags were 
close to 0. It is reasonable to use annual data to calibrate the model, since the model assumes that wages are set 
once each period, and most people’s wages are adjusted once each year. 
13 See, for example, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Card (1991). Assuming that ψ=0 means that it is not 
necessary to model the formation of price expectations. 
14 Figure 1 includes arrows to show the shifts of the DLD and DEWS curves. However, an arrow is not 
used to show the leftward shift of the DLD curve between periods 2 and 3 since the distance between the lines is 
too small. 
15 In Figure 2, the Phillips curve shifts between periods 0 and 1 because inflationary expectations are partly 
rational, so these expectations partly decrease along with actual inflation. If expectations are assumed to be 
completely adaptive, the Phillips curve does not shift between periods 0 and 1. 
16 See equation 25 on p. 698 of Phelps (1968).    
17 This is the same equation for the price-price Phillips curve that was derived in Campbell (2010), except it 
was implicitly assumed that ζ was normalized to 1 in Campbell (2010).   
18 See Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for a discussion of the fair wage-effort hypothesis. 
19 If efficiency is assumed to depend on real wages, a firm’s wage decision will depend on expectations of 
the price level over the next three periods. 
